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            Party Loyalty and Committee Assignment in the U.S. House of Representatives 
 
 House committee assignment has long been a widely-discussed topic in academic 
research due to its strategic legislative importance. A place where most bills are formulated, 
House committees cultivate members’ legislative expertise on policy areas key to the interests of 
the country. One question often ignites debate among political scientists: By which criteria are 
committee assignments allocated? 
 By the theory of self-selection, the primary principle of allocation is to ratify member’s 
preferences. Proponents of this theory argue that it benefits the party to accommodate member’s 
requests. Members usually request committees that are directly related to their constituencies. 
Accordingly, if members can serve on committees they request, they will be able to secure more 
preferential treatments for their constituents. Hence their constituents will be more likely to 
reelect them, maximizing their party’s advantage over other parties. Professor Irwin Gertzog of 
Allegheny College is one of the most prominent scholars who supports this theory of self-
selection. In his article, The Routinization of Committee Assignment in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, he emphasizes the high proportion of members who got their first-choice 
assignments within a few terms arriving in Congress. He interprets this as evidence that the 
assignment process was largely nondiscretionary, leaving little room for partisan manipulation of 
assignment.1 Keith Krehbiel, a Stanford University professor of political science, agrees. He 
argues that, when a member’s individual preferences were controlled, party influence had little 
impact on committee assignments.2 
On the other hand, proponents of the party-selection theory argue that party leaders pick 
their favorites when deciding committee assignments. In Parties and Leaders in the Post-Reform 
House, American journalist David Rohde observes a strong resurgence of party cohesion and 
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 partisanship in the House of the 1980s, arguing that party leaders have been exerting strong 
influence on committee assignments.3 Congressional expert Barbara Sinclair also concludes that 
party loyalty had become a significant consideration in committee assignment decisions by the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. Party leaders would compute party-support scores for members 
based on their own selection of key votes. In addition, those who gave nominating speeches for 
exclusive committees often mentioned whether or not a member adhered to the party’s causes.4  
As a consequence of party selection, John Manley, also a Stanford political science professor, 
notes that Democratic members of the prestigious Ways and Means Committee tend to support 
their party in voting more than the average House Democrats.5 
Political scientist Kenneth Shepsle foreshadows the two points of view in his book, The 
Giant Jigsaw Puzzle: Democratic Committee Assignment in the Modern House. Although 
Shepsle wrote this book earlier than most other works cited above, he seemed to foresee the 
argument and found merits from both of the opposing sides. Shepsle describes the assignment 
process as an interest-advocacy-accommodation process. This process starts with members 
articulating and advocating for their own interests. Ultimately, such interests are accommodated 
in a highly institutionalized fashion, in which party considerations come into play.6 
Indeed, the demand for good committee assignment always exceeds supply. Two political 
science professors, Scott Frisch and Sean Kelly, computed each House committee’s request 
success rate from the 86th Congress to the 101st Congress. The result shows that Banking & 
Finance, Energy & Commerce, and Rules committees all have a success rate below 30 percent, 
and the success rate of other prestigious committees, such as Ways & Means and Budge are just 
slightly above 30 percent.7 Therefore, even if Congresspeople are able to get on the committee 
that they want, certain prestigious committees are often too popular and hence remain out of 
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 reach. As a result, decisions have to be based on other criteria. This paper seeks to explore if 
Representatives’ loyalty to their parties is one of these criteria. 
Past Empirical Studies 
Many scholars have conducted statistical assessments to test whether party loyalty 
impacts committee assignment.8 In 1973, Rohde and Shepsle computed a “party support score” 
for each Democratic Congress member based on how closely he/she voted with the party on all 
roll call bills in the previous term.9 They labeled members as either “Supporters,” who voted 
more loyally to the party than the party average, or “Non-supporters,” who voted less loyally 
than the average. Rohde and Shepsle found that in the aggregate, 58 percent of “Supporters” 
secured a requested committee assignment, compared to only 37 percent of the “Non-
supporters.” In another study, Stanford professor Gary Cox and Duke professor Matthew 
McCubbins performed a regression analyses to test the correlation between a House member’s 
transfer committee success rate and this member’s loyalty to the party.10 They defined party 
loyalty as the percentage of times that a member voted with his/her party leader and party whip, 
in opposition to the party leader and whip of the opposing party, among all roll call bills in the 
previous Congress.11 Their regression analyses showed that for Republicans, a decline in a 
loyalty from the 95th to 50th percentile would yield a decline of 6.2 percent in the likelihood of 
transferring. For Democrats, the figure is as high as 11.2 percent. While these two studies form a 
solid basis for studying the relationship between party loyalty and committee assignment, there 
are four problems in their methodologies that this paper notes and aims to improve upon. 
First, as Congress has become increasingly (some would say shockingly) polarized, most 
members now vote with the party on almost all bills. Using all roll call bills to calculate 
members’ loyalty scores—as Rohde and Shepsle did in their research—would most likely now 
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 result in huge clusters of similar scores, making it difficult to distinguish loyal members from 
disloyal ones. 
Second, Rohde and Shepsle used a binary system to differentiate members’ level of 
loyalty. Members were characterized as either “Supporters” or “Non-supporters.” Yet among 
“Supporters” there were both highly loyal members and moderately loyal members. Similarly, 
the “Non-supporters” group contained both highly rebellious members and moderately 
independent members. A binary categorization could not tell whether the difference between 
“Supporters” and “Non-supporters” was mainly caused by highly loyal/disloyal members or 
moderately loyal/disloyal members. 
In fact, there has been intensive debate about whether members with extreme or moderate 
political leanings are rewarded more in the assignment process. Political scientists Nicole 
Asmussen and Adam Ramey described in detail the opposing points of view in their 2018 paper 
on party loyalty: Some believe that extremists are more favored in committee selection because 
extreme legislators are particularly prone to ideological grandstanding. Hence, party leaders 
cannot take extremists’ votes for granted and have to reward their extreme members who 
nevertheless toe the party line. On the other hand, many believe that party leaders have more 
incentives to reward party moderates, since moderates usually represents the swing votes that are 
crucial for highly-contested bills.12 Inspired by this contention, this paper will distinguish 
between highly loyal/disloyal members and moderately loyal/disloyal members instead of simply 
lumping members into the “Supporter” or “Non-supporter” group. 
Third, Cox and McCubbins defined success of assignment as the ability to transfer 
between committees. Rohde and Shepsle defined success as being able to secure a requested 
assignment. Both definitions measure success from an individualized viewpoint. Yet some 
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 members are inherently more conservative than others when it comes to which committees to 
request. These members will have a higher success rate since they rarely request committees that 
they know will not take them. Therefore, it is also important to define success by some less 
individualized and more universal metrics. 
Lastly, both studies only analyzed if party loyalty affected committee assignment. 
Neither study explored whether members would become more loyal after obtaining desired 
committee assignments. This paper seeks to explore the reverse relationship as well. 
Data & Research Design 
To examine the relationships between party loyalty and committee assignment, this paper 
will test the following four null hypotheses, in which the word “members” refers to the members 
the United States House of Representatives. 
Null hypothesis 1: Loyal members are as likely to obtain favorable committee 
assignments as disloyal members. 
Null hypothesis 2: Highly loyal members are as likely to obtain favorable committee 
assignments as moderately loyal members. 
Null hypothesis 3: Highly disloyal members are as likely to obtain favorable committee 
assignments as moderately disloyal members. 
Null hypothesis 4: Members who have obtained favorable committee assignments are as 
likely to become more loyal as to become less loyal to their party. 
While there is debate in academia about the rigor of null hypothesis testing, null hypothesis is 
still by far one of the most frequently used methods in political science studies. For example, 
take Cox and McCubbins’ examination of the impact of loyalty on committee transfer. They 
tested the null hypothesis that loyalty to the party leadership has no effect on the success of a 
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 member's transfer requests.13 The clarity and simplicity of null hypothesis testing makes it a 
good fit to examine the questions posted in this paper as well. Nevertheless, rigorous testing of 
the null hypotheses requires a consistent approach to measure loyalty and define favorable 
committee assignments, which will be explained in the rest of the section. 
To measure loyalty, this paper defines a members’ loyalty score as the degree of 
similarity between a member’s roll-call voting record and that of the party’s majority. Roll-call 
voting record from the 101st Congress to the 115th Congress was obtained from the Github 
repository.14 To eliminate occasions when most members vote with their parties, this paper only 
selected roll-call votes where the winning side has a less-than-twenty-vote advantage over the 
losing side.15 
Unlike the famous DW Nominate scoring mechanism, in which a member’s ideology 
score is based on his/her entire voting record,16 this paper only takes into account a member’s 
voting record in the nearest Congress, aiming to prioritize the member’s current loyalty level. 
This paper also believes that comparison with party majority’s voting record can better reflect a 
member’s loyalty than comparison with that of party leader. This is because the House Steering 
Committees, where committee assignments are discussed and finalized, include members from 
all backgrounds. The party majority’s voting record can approximate the preference of the entire 
steering committee. 
To calculate the degree of similarity between a member’s voting record and that of the 
party majority, this paper converted each member’s voting record into a three-dimensional 
numeric vector. “Aye” is represented by number “1,” “Nay” is represented by number “-1” and 
“Not Voting” is represented by number “0.” Similarly, the party majority’s voting record is also 
represented by a numeric vector of “1” “-1”, and “0.” 
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 There has been debate about whether to include scenarios of “Not Voting.” On the one 
hand, the number of times a member does not vote, especially on critical matters, could greatly 
affect how loyal party leaders perceive him/her to be. On the other hand, the number of times a 
member does not vote can be beyond his/her control. For instance, some members were selected 
through special elections in the middle of the current Congressional term. The number of votes 
they missed should not be a factor in determining their loyalty. To solve this dilemma, this paper 
adopted three statistical methods to compute the similarity between members’ voting records and 
that of the party majority, with two methods taking into account “Not Voting” and one method 
disregarding “Not Voting.” The three statistical methods this paper used are the following: 
1) Cosine-based Similarity: Under this method, the similarity is measured by computing 
the cosine angle between the two vectors of voting records. Let ?⃗? denote the vector representing 
the voting record of member A; let ?⃗? denote the vector representing the voting record of the 
party majority. Member A’s loyalty score is given by: 
Similarity = cosine (?⃗?, ?⃗?) = 
?⃗?  ∙  ?⃗?
∥ ?⃗? ∥2∗∥ ?⃗? ∥2 
 
Note: ‘∙’ refers to the dot product of the two vectors. 
2) Correlation-based Similarity: For this method, the similarity is measured by 
computing the Pearson correlation coefficient between the two vectors of voting records. Let ?⃗? 
denote the vector representing the voting record of member A; let ?⃗? denote the vector 
representing the voting record of the party majority. Member A’s loyalty score is: 
Similarity = correlation (?⃗?, ?⃗?) = 
∑ (𝒙𝒊 − ?⃗⃗?)(𝒚𝒊 − ?⃗⃗?)
𝒏
𝒊 = 𝟏
√∑ (𝒙𝒊 − ?⃗⃗?)𝟐
𝒏
𝒊 = 𝟏 √∑ (𝒚𝒊 − ?⃗⃗?)
𝟐𝒏
𝒊 = 𝟏
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 Note: 1. n is the number of selected bills for each Congress, i.e. vector length 
2. 𝐱𝐢 is member A’s vote on bill i; 𝐲𝐢 is party majority’s vote on bill i 
3. ?⃗?  =
𝟏
𝐧
∑ 𝐱𝐢
𝐧
𝐢=𝟏  
3) Cosine-based Similarity Adjusted to Not Voting:  As a complement to method (a), this 
method is aimed at negating the impact of “Not Voting” on loyalty score. Again, let ?⃗? denote the 
vector representing the voting record of member A; let ?⃗? denote the vector representing the 
voting record of the party majority. If the 𝑖𝑡ℎ item of ?⃗? is “0,” both the 𝑖𝑡ℎ item of ?⃗? and ?⃗? will be 
deleted. The resulting two vectors ?⃗? and ?⃗? are still of the same length, and neither contain any “0” 
entry. Member A’s loyalty score is computed by the same equation given in method 1). 
After loyalty scores are produced, members are ranked from the highest score to the 
lowest score and fitted into five score ranges: the top 20 percent of members are considered 
highly loyal; the top 20 percent to the top 40 percent considered moderately loyal; the top 40 
percent to the top 60 percent considered independent; the top 60 percent to the top 80 percent 
considered moderately disloyal; and members in the bottom 20 percent considered highly 
disloyal. This paper divides loyalty group by rank rather than value, because loyalty a relative. In 
a highly uniform Congress, most members would have a high loyalty score. In a split Congress, 
even a moderately high loyalty score would be deemed valuable by party leaders. 
To test the first null hypothesis, this paper also classifies loyalty in a binary way. Highly 
loyal and moderately loyal members form the group of loyal members. Highly disloyal and 
moderately disloyal members compose the group of disloyal members. This binary classification 
derived from a five-fold classification is more precise, since removing the middle fold eliminates 
the interference from the most moderate members. 
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 Having measured loyalty, this paper still needs to define “favorite committee assignment.” 
As suggested in the reviews of past studies, this paper seeks to measure favorite assignment in 
universal metrics that are independent of members’ self-evaluation. In fact, there is certain 
degree of consensus among scholars about which committees should be considered prestigious 
and universally desired. Frisch and Kelly named Appropriations, Budget, Rules and Ways & 
Means as prestigious committees in their study,17 which coincides with Cox and McCubbins’ 
definition of “control committees” in their book Legislative Leviathan.18 
Accordingly, this paper defines favorable committee assignment in two ways. First, it can 
be selection into one of the four prestigious committees—Appropriation, Budget, Rules, and 
Ways and Means. Second, it can be election as the chair or ranking member of any committee. 
To match roll-call voting data, this paper acquired committee assignment data from the 101st to 
the 115th Congress from the website of MIT Professor Charles Steward.19 Having defined both 
loyalty and favorable assignment, this paper now sets out to test the four null hypotheses laid out 
in the beginning of this section on both parties and both metrics of favorable assignment. Since 
this paper believes that the visualization of trend is more informative to readers than simple 
numeration of statistics, the next section will focus mainly on presenting graphs rather than pure 
numbers. 
Results 
Null hypothesis 1: loyal member vs disloyal member 
On the Republican side, when favorable assignment is defined as selection into prestigious 
committees,  the p-values returned by three statistical methods all stand well below a 
significance level of 0.05, indicating that for Republicans newly selected into prestigious 
committees, the average percentage of loyal members is greater than that of disloyal members 
9
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 (Figure 1.) Since this paper includes an equal number of loyal and disloyal members, the fact that 
more loyal members are in prestigious committees demonstrates that for Republicans, loyalty is 
likely a factor of prestigious committee selection. 
The result for the Democratic Party is more complicated. Since none of the three methods 
report a p-value within the significance level of 0.05, the null hypothesis cannot be effectively 
rejected (Figure 1.) Yet it may also be wrong to conclude that loyalty has no effect on 
Democratic appointments, since the failure to reject the null hypothesis may be largely attributed 
to the surge of disloyal members elected to prestigious committees from the 113th to the 115th 
Congresses. When looking at the rest of the Congresses, the advantage to the loyal over the 
disloyal is self-evident. Without further investigation, it is unclear whether the surge of disloyal 
members in the 113th to 115th Congress is just an ephemeral blip or a start of a long-lasting new 
trend. 
When the definition of favorable assignment changes from “prestigious committee” to 
“election of chair and ranking member,” the difference between Democrats and Republicans are 
more noticeable. On the Republican side, two of the three statistical methods indicate a p-value 
below the significance level of 0.05, inferring that, on average, the advantage of loyal members 
over disloyal members is statistically significant (Figure 2.) Yet on the Democratic side, all three 
methods produced a p-value greater than the significance level of 0.05, meaning that among 
newly-elected Democratic chairs and ranking members, the average percentage of loyal members 
are not statistically higher than the average percentage of disloyal members (Figure 2.) 
Overall, the test of null hypothesis 1 showed consistent result in favor of loyalty on the 
Republicans side, whereas the results for Democrats are more subtle and unclear. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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 measured by the Cosine Similarity method, more moderately loyal members were elected to 
prestigious committees than highly loyal members in seven out of thirteen Congresses. In merely 
five out of thirteen Congresses, more highly loyal members were elected than moderately loyal 
members. The other two methods produced similar results. 
This paper also did not find compelling evidence that highly disloyal members are less 
likely to be elected to prestigious committees than moderately disloyal members on the 
Republican side. Although the method Cosine Similarity Adjusted to Not Voting returned a p-
value slightly below the 0.05 significance level, neither of the other two methods corroborate 
with this finding. The advantage of moderately disloyal members over highly disloyal members 
does not stand out distinctly. 
The same tests for Democrats yield similar results. There is no statistical evidence that 
highly loyal members are more likely to get onto prestigious committees than moderately loyal 
members. Nor is there evidence that highly disloyal members are less likely to make their way 
onto prestigious committees (Figure 3.) 
Figure 3 also sheds light on the trend of prestigious committee selection in the past 
thirteen Congresses. In the most recent three to five Congresses, an increasing number of less 
loyal members have been selected. For both parties after the 110th Congress, the percentage of 
members considered disloyal (by this paper’s definition) is almost equal to the percentage of 
loyal members. This observation directly contradicts the common belief that the House is 
becoming ever more polarized. 
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Figure 3 
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 When the definition of favorable assignment changes from “prestigious committee” to 
“election of chair and ranking member,” the effect of loyalty does not play out in a linear way 
either. The percentage difference between moderately loyal members and highly loyal members 
is not statistically significant, nor the percentage difference between moderately disloyal 
members and highly disloyal members (Figure 4.) Moreover, there is tentative evidence that 
moderately loyal members might actually performed better than highly loyal members. For 
instance, on the Republican sides, the Cosine Similarity methods indicates that on average 24.47 
percent of new chairs and ranking members are moderately loyal members whereas only 21.43 
percent are highly loyal members. Furthermore, while in seven out of thirteen Congresses more 
moderately loyal members were elected chairs or ranking members than highly loyal members, 
the opposite was true in only five out of thirteen Congresses. Democrats exhibit similar patterns, 
as can be seen from Figure 8. The favorability of moderate members in chair and ranking 
member selection is not unexpected, as chairs and ranking members have to possess the ability to 
mediate communications among members with various ideological leanings. 
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Figure 4 
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 Null Hypothesis 4: Loyalty increases or decreases after receiving favorable assignments 
For both parties, the loyalty levels of most members remain the same before and after 
their receiving favorable committee assignments. On average, the percentage of members whose 
loyalty has increased is not different from the percentage of members whose loyalty has 
decreased. Null hypothesis 4 cannot be effectively disproved for either party, since 5 out of 6 p-
values stand over the 0.05 significance range (Figure 5.) Therefore, for both Republicans and 
Democrats, there is no evidence that selection into prestigious committees will make members 
vote more closely with their parties. 
When the definition of favorable assignment changes to “chairs and ranking members,” 
tests on Republican showed statistically significant. All three methods produce a p-value within 
the 0.05 significance level (Figure 6,) rejecting the null hypothesis in favor of the new 
conclusion that Republicans on average become more loyal to their party after being elected 
chairs or ranking members. 
However, it should also be noted that the above conclusion is mostly produced by the 
period from the 103rd to the119th Congress. As shown in Figure 11, after the 110th Congress, 
many Republican chairs actually became less loyal to their party after their appointments, 
meaning that, though statistically significant, the increase of Republican chairs’ loyalty does not 
hold for every Congress. This subtle observation attests to the necessity to combine statistical 
analysis with graphics when interpreting results. 
Meanwhile, tests on Democrats still yield no statistically significant results when 
favorable assignments are defined as being elected to chairs and ranking members. This adds to 
the overall observation that loyalty affects Republicans more than Democrats. 
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Figure 5 
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Figure 6 
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 assignment is stronger for Republicans than for Democrats. While either trend must be the 
product of multiple factors, this paper proposes one possible explanation for each trend. 
In terms of moderately loyal vs highly loyal, many highly loyal members are elected from safe 
districts (districts where their party holds a strong electoral advantage over its opponent.) The 
interests of their constituents naturally overlap with those of their party. Meanwhile, party 
leaders tend to allocate powerful assignments to members in swing districts to boost their 
reelection chance. Thus, highly loyal members might not be rewarded as much as their loyalty 
scores suggest.  
To examine this idea that party leaders favor members from swing districts in committee 
assignment, this paper examined the twenty-three Republican House members whose 
constituencies voted for Hillary Clinton over Donald Trump in the 2016 election, since these 
members can be seen as coming from swing districts. As of November 2017, five of the twenty-
three members are serving on the Committee on Ways and Means, with Peter Roskam (R-IL) 
chairing the Tax Policy subcommittee, Dave Reichert (R-WA) chairing the Trade subcommittee, 
and Carlos Curbelo (R-FL) elected as one of the only two sophomore representatives. Three of 
the twenty-three are serving on the Committee on Appropriation, with John Culberson (R-TX) 
and Kevin Yoder (R-KS) chairing two subcommittees within Appropriation. Furthermore, four 
of the twenty-three are/were chairs of a House Standing Committee: Darrell Issa (R-CA) chaired 
the Committee on Oversight and Government Reforms; Pete Session (R-TX) is chairing the 
Committee on Rules; Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) chaired the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and 
Ed Royce is chairing the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Clearly, these twenty-three members are 
disproportionally appointed to important positions in strategic committees, which supports the 
claim that members from swing district are more likely to obtain powerful assignments. 
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 Daniel Lee of Duke University resonates with the above reasoning. As Lee points out, 
“Party leadership expects that a member who is in a district with interests congruent with those 
of the party and is electorally safe should be able to show high levels of party loyalty easily. 
Conversely, the leadership has lower expectations for a member who is in a district with 
incongruent interest and electorally unsafe, since this member is taking a bigger risk in showing 
party loyalty.”20 Lee’s analysis also points to an important limitation shared by many studies of 
party loyalty, including this one: The measurement of loyalty needs to account for the political 
leaning of each member’s constituency. Their constituencies’ political leanings should then 
constitute the baseline of members’ loyalty scores and each member may have a different 
baseline score. A recent study conducted by Nicole Asmussen and Adam Ramey attempts to 
measure such baseline loyalty by resorting to lopsided roll call votes. They assume that party 
pressure would only be exerted selectively on tightly contested bills. Hence lopsided roll calls 
would measure members’ “party-free” ideal points.21 However, one may also argue that the 
opposite is true: members are more likely to cast symbolic votes rather than votes that truly 
reflect their ideologies when they know their votes would be matter. Therefore, one should 
evaluate a member’s loyalty by studying the political leaning of his or her constituents, rather 
than simply using select rollcall votes. 
Regarding the second trend—that Republicans seem to emphasize loyalty more than 
Democrats, this paper attributes it partly to Republican’s majority party status and their small 
seat advantage. First, within the thirteen Congresses include in this research, Republicans 
controlled ten of them. Multiple studies have shown that majority parties tend to emphasize 
loyalty more than minority parties. For instance, the study conducted by Asmussen and Ramey in 
2018 reveal that party loyalty mattered significantly less when the party was the minority. They 
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 stated that the majority party has a more urgent need to have a record of legislative 
accomplishments, so they were more likely to resort to committee assignment to strengthen party 
discipline.22 Furthermore, Republicans held only a slight majority in terms of seats, which further 
pushed them to emphasize loyalty. As demonstrated in Table 1,23  when Democrats were the 
majority party of the House, they usually possessed a greater seat advantage over Republicans. 
Yet when Republicans were the majority of the House, they often controlled the House only with 
a small seat advantage. A slight majority made loyalty an extremely important concept to 
Republicans, urging Republican leadership to place loyal members on critical committee 
appointments. From the 112th to the 115th Congress, Republicans started to expand their lead and 
enlarge their majority-party advantage over Democrats. It is also during this period that we see 
the effect of loyalty growing smaller on Republican committee assignments. In that sense, 
loyalty plays a more significant role in tightly contested Congresses, especially for the majority 
party. 
 
Table 1 
 
Congress Number	of	Democratic	Seats Number	of	Republican	Seats Majority	Party
103rd 258 176 D
104th 204 230 R
105th 207 226 R
106th 211 223 R
107th 212 221 R
108th 205 229 R
109th 202 231 R
110th 236 199 D
111th 257 178 D
112th 193 242 R
113th 201 234 R
114th 188 247 R
115th 194 241 R
Party	Division	by	Congress
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 Limitations 
Notwithstanding its inventive research design, this study has limitations. For instance, 
three of the four hypotheses tested in the paper do not take into account inertia in the assignment 
process. Inertia refers to the fact that once members have a berth on a committee, they tend to 
remain in subsequent congresses unless they request to transfer. Separating first-time committee 
members and senior members can help control the impact of inertia however this paper 
intentionally included committee members of all terms in the testing of the first three hypotheses, 
due to concerns of limited sample sizes. 
Conventionally, prestigious committees add few new members from the minority party.  
Take the Rules Committee for example. As Republicans controlled all of the most recent four 
Congresses (112th to 115th), only two new Democratic members were selected to the Rules 
Committee during this period.24 The Ways and Means Committee also had few new Democratic 
members in the same period. In fact, it is not uncommon for a prestigious committee to not 
include any new member from the minority party in the initial assignment process. Therefore, 
controlling for inertia by separating first-time committee members is bound to result in 
extremely small sample sizes, which would yield inaccurate results in testing. 
Nevertheless, this paper partially accounted for inertia by adding the fourth null 
hypothesis, i.e. whether members become more and less loyalty to their parties after being 
rewarded in the assignment process. As the testing result showed little evidence of members 
become less loyal after getting onto prestigious committees, it is reasonable to assume that 
members’ loyalty do not significantly change even if they know they are likely to remain on 
prestigious committees in subsequent terms. Hence, the impact of inertia will not fundamentally 
upend the findings in this paper. 
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 In addition to inertia, certain topics that are important to the evaluation of committee 
assignment are also not within the scope of this paper. These topics include transfer requests, 
committee size manipulation, internal politics within the Steering Committee, and party leaders.  
As Shepsle demonstrates in his seminal book The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle, a compelling 
investigation into the committee assignment process needs to account for a myriad of factors, 
synthesize evidence from multiple datasets, and connect quantitative evidence with a qualitative 
understanding of the inner workings of Congress.  
Conclusion 
 This paper examines the relationship between House members’ loyalty to their party and 
the outcome of their committee assignments. Through testing four null hypotheses, this paper not 
only investigated into loyalty’s correlation with favorability in assignment, but also explored the 
subtle difference between consistent loyalty and moderate loyalty, and how loyalty changes after 
members receiving good assignments. 
 First, this paper found that loyal Republicans are statistically more likely to be elected to 
prestigious committees or to become chairs and ranking members than disloyal Republicans. For 
Democrats, the advantage of loyal members is not statistically significant. This result does not 
come as a surprise, since the Republican Party is generally considered as more centralized in 
nature than the Democratic Party. 
 Next, this paper found that a member’s chance of obtaining favorable assignment does 
not always increase with his/her loyalty to the party. Interestingly, this founding is especially true 
for Republicans. Among all Congresses covered in this study, the number of Congresses with 
more moderately loyal than highly loyal Republicans surpasses the number of Congresses with 
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 more highly loyal than moderately loyal Republicans. This observation points to the limitation of 
using loyalty to explain who obtains what committee assignments. 
Last but not least, this paper tested the null hypothesis that members who obtained a 
favorable committee assignment are as likely to become more loyal as to become less loyal to 
his/her party. While this hypothesis is in general not disproved, from the 103rd to 109th Congress, 
a plurality of newly-appointed Republican chairs did become more loyal to their party after their 
appointments. These chairs may have become more loyal after the resurgence of party discipline 
under former Republican House Speaker Newt Gingrich. However, it remains unknown if this 
trend will continue in the future. 
 The House committee assignment process is obviously affected by a host of factors. 
Some of them are detailed in this paper while others are not. This study aimed to offer readers a 
general sense of how loyalty affects committee assignment and provide insight for scholars of 
political science that might be useful in their future studies. 
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